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ABSTRACT
The anniversaries of the bombings of Dresden on 13 and 14 February 1945 have
become key events in Germany’s memory calendar. This article examines the
role that local civil society agents have played in shaping, and changing, local
memory culture in Dresden after 2005. It will explore how different memory agents
interpreted the Dresden bombings, what significance for the present they attributed
to them, what memory practices they adopted, and how these led to a significant
transformation of local memory culture. I will argue that the years 2005 to 2016
saw two important shifts in local memory culture. First, the initiatives of local
civil society activists, who aimed to resurrect ‘forgotten’ memories and advocated
alternative memory practices, resulted in a more diverse and pluralist local memory
landscape. A key dimension of this was the diversification of the meaning of
victimhood that included, crucially, victims of Nazi persecution. Secondly, these
years witnessed a reassessment of the meaning of the Dresden bombings and of
the inherently political character of the annual commemoration, linking the legacy
of the bombings unambiguously to the fight for tolerance and against right-wing
extremism.
Der Jahrestag der Bombardierung Dresdens am 13. und 14. Februar 1945 ist seit
langer Zeit ein wichtiges Datum der deutschen Erinnerungskultur. Im vorliegenden
Artikel wird die Bedeutung zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure fu¨r die Gestaltung und
Vera¨nderung der lokalen Erinnerungskultur in Dresden untersucht. Dabei liegt
der Schwerpunkt einerseits darauf, wie verschiedene erinnerungskulturelle Akteure
die Bombenangriffe interpretierten und welche Bedeutung sie diesen fu¨r die
Gegenwart beimessen als andererseits auch darauf, mit welchen Praktiken sie die
Erinnerung formen und dadurch zu einem bedeutenden Wandel der lokalen
Erinnerungskultur beitrugen. Das Hauptargument des Artikels zeigt einen solchen
Wandel in den Jahren von 2005 bis 2016 in zweierlei Hinsicht auf. Zum ersten
kam es zu einer Diversifizierung und Pluralisierung der Erinnerungskultur durch
die gro¨ßere Beru¨cksichtigung ‘vergessener’ Erinnerungen und die Verbreitung
vielfa¨ltigerer Erinnerungspraktiken. Dies beinhaltete auch eine Vera¨nderung des
Opferbegriffs, der nun sta¨rker den Opfern nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen
Rechnung tra¨gt. Zum zweiten fand in diesen Jahren eine Neubeurteilung der
Erinnerungskultur selbst statt, infolge derer ihre politische Funktion anerkannt
und unmittelbar mit dem Kampf gegen Rassismus und Rechtsextremismus
verknu¨pft wurde.
This article examines the changes in how the anniversaries of the
Dresden bombings have been remembered and made sense of in the
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last fifteen years. By focusing on the interventions of local political and
memory activists, I will shed light on the wider political significance of
the anniversary, not only for local memory culture but also for wider
debates in German political culture. One of the main reasons why
the anniversaries have gained national significance is precisely because
participants attribute wider political meaning to the events of the past
and present-day commemorative practices. The debate, in Dresden and
beyond, over appropriate commemorative practices touches upon a set of
fundamental political values and issues which include tolerance and anti-
racism, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, the understanding
of democracy, the legitimacy of civil disobedience, and the boundaries
of police intervention. It is precisely because such central political issues
are deemed to be at stake that activists from across the political spectrum
furnish the anniversaries with meaning in and relevance for the present,
rendering the anniversaries an important moment not only in Germany’s
memory culture but also in its political culture. For the decade between
2005 and 2015, Dresden’s anniversary capital very much rested on the
anniversary’s status as an important political event in which Germans
negotiated the appropriateness and effectiveness of different means to
confront the far right not just at local and regional levels, but also at the
national level.
Dresden has long been a national site of memory.1 The anniversaries
of the bombings of the city on 13 and 14 February 1945 have become
key events in Germany’s memory calendar. As Gilad Margalit argues, the
anniversaries are ‘not just local affairs’ but have a ‘nationwide impact’.2
Dresden has become the symbolic German ‘Opferstadt’ and, in David
Crew’s words, ‘a supersite of national memory and commemoration’.3
Since 1990, Dresden has also become an international site of memory.
The German TV film Dresden (2006), repeatedly broadcast in the UK on
Channel 4, and the Daily Mail’s attempt to turn the participation of the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, in the 2015 commemoration into
a scandal,4 are but two examples of Dresden’s status as an international lieu
de me´moire.
1 Olaf B. Rader, ‘Dresden’, in Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, 3 vols, ed. Etienne Franc¸ois and Hagen
Schulze, Munich 2001, III, pp. 451–70. Anne Fuchs, ‘World War II in German Cultural Memory:
Dresden as Lieu de Memoire’, in The Routledge Handbook of German Politics and Culture, ed. Sarah
Colvin, London 2015, pp. 48–70.
2 Gilad Margalit, Guilt, Suffering, and Memory. Germany Remembers Its Dead of World War II, Indiana
2010, p. 266.
3 David Crew, Bodies and Ruins. Imagining the Bombing of Germany, 1945 to the Present, Ann Arbor, MI
2017, p. 168.
4 Larisa Brown and Steve Doughty, ‘Archbishop says sorry for bombing the Nazis: ... as BBC
insults RAF heroes over Dresden’, Daily Mail, 14 February 2015, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2952945/amp/Archbishop-says-sorry-bombing-Nazis-Justin-Welby-attacked-bizarre-apo
logy-Dresden-raids-makes-no-reference-RAF-heroes-killed- (accessed 7 June 2020).
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Many aspects of how Dresden has been remembered have received
academic interest, in particular architecture, art, literature, film, and
politics in the GDR.5 Remarkably little attention has been paid to
local memory culture after 2000. Tony Joel’s detailed discussion of
the multifaceted memory events of 2005, terming them a ‘memory
battleground’, did not explore the local tensions and controversies over
commemorative practices, and largely ignores civil society agents.6 Thomas
Fache’s survey of local memory discourses since 1945 ends with the
observation that, by 2008, ‘eine Neujustierung des Gedenkens’ was under
way.7 Similarly, Claudia Jerzak’s study of how local civil society groups
interpret the bombings and approach their commemoration between
1990 and 2008 identifies a shift in local memory culture that had been
set in motion by 2008.8 More recently, Mathias Berek has developed a
useful classification of five different local collective memories, together
5 Susanne Vees-Gulani, ‘The Politics of New Beginnings: The Continued Exclusion of the Nazi
Past in Dresden’s Cityscape’, in Beyond Berlin: German Cities Confront the Nazi Past, ed. Gavriel
David Rosenfeld, Ann Arbor, MI 2008; Susanne Vees-Gulani, ‘From Frankfurt’s Goethehaus to
Dresden’s Frauenkirche: Architecture, German Identity, and Historical Memory after 1945’, The
Germanic Review, 80/2 (2005), 143–63; Anne Fuchs, After the Dresden Bombing: Pathways of Memory,
1945 to the Present, Basingstoke 2011; Karl-Siegbert Rehberg and Matthias Neutzner, ‘The Dresden
Frauenkirche as a Contested Symbol: The Architecture of Remembrance After the War’, in War
and Cultural Heritage: Biographies of Place, ed. Marie Louise Stig Sørensen and Dacia Viejo-Rose,
Cambridge 2015, pp. 98–127; Bill Niven, ‘The GDR and Memory of the Bombing of Dresden’, in
Germans as Victims. Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany, ed. Bill Niven, Basingstoke 2006,
pp. 109–29; Die Zersto¨rung Dresdens. Antworten der Ku¨nste, ed. Walter Schmitz, Dresden 2005; Susanne
Vees-Gulani, Trauma and Guilt. Literature of Wartime Bombing in Germany, Berlin 2003; Thomas Fox,
‘Writing Dresden Across the Generations’, in Victims and Perpetrators: 1933–1945. (Re)Presenting the
Past in Post-Unification Culture, ed. Laurel Cohen-Pfister and Dagmar Wienroeder-Skinner, Berlin
2006; David F. Crew, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy? A Fiction Film for German Television about
the Bombing of Dresden’, Central European History, 40/1 (2007), 117–32; Susanne Vees-Gulani,
‘The Ruined Picture Postcard: Dresden’s Visually Encoded History and the Television Drama
Dresden’, New German Critique, 38/1 (2011), 85–113; Gilad Margalit, ‘Der Luftangriff auf Dresden.
Seine Bedeutung fu¨r die Erinnerungspolitik der DDR und fu¨r die Herauskristallisierung einer
historischen Kriegserinnerung im Westen’, in Narrative der Shoah: Repra¨sentationen der Vergangenheit
in Historiographie, Kunst und Politik, ed. Susanne Du¨well, Paderborn 2002, pp. 189–207; Margalit,
Guilt, Suffering, and Memory (note 2); Tony Joel, The Dresden Firebombing: Memory and the Politics of
Commemorating Destruction, London 2013; Thomas Widera, ‘Gefangene Erinnerung. Die politische
Instrumentalisierung der Bombardierung Dresdens’, in Alliierter Bombenkrieg. Das Beispiel Dresden, ed.
Lothar Fritze and Thomas Widera, Go¨ttingen 2005, pp. 109–34; Matthias Neutzner, ‘Vom Anklagen
zum Erinnern: die Erza¨hlung vom 13. Februar’, in Das Rote Leuchten. Dresden und der Bombenkrieg, ed.
Oliver Reinhard, Matthias Neutzner, and Wolfgang Hesse, Dresden 2005, pp. 128–63; Crew, Bodies
and Ruins (note 3).
6 Joel, The Dresden Firebombing (note 5).
7 Thomas Fache, ‘Gegenwartsbewa¨ltigungen. Dresdens Gedenken an die Alliierten Luftangriffe vor
und nach 1989’, in Luftkrieg in Erinnerungen in Deutschland und Europa, ed. Jo¨rg Arnold, Dietmar Su¨ß,
and Malte Thießen, Go¨ttingen 2009, pp. 221–38 (p. 238).
8 Claudia Jerzak, ‘Gedenken an den 13. Februar 1945. Perspektiven Dresdner AkteurInnen auf die
Entwicklung von Erinnerungskultur und kollektivem Geda¨chtnis seit 1990’, Diplomarbeit, Dresden
2009.
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with the aims of the local groups and organisations championing them.9
While these studies provide valuable insights into the discourses among
local memory activists and the intersection of local and national memory
cultures, the development of local memory after 2005 and the dynamics of
change as a renegotiation between local activists and city officials remain
unexplored.
This article traces these significant changes in Dresden’s memory culture
between 2005 and 2016 through the lens of local civil society activists and
evaluates their influence on commemorative discourses and practices. In
doing so, it heeds Jenny Wu¨stenberg’s recent call to give more credit to how
grass-roots initiatives have shaped German memory culture.10 Her study
has broken important ground in demonstrating the significant impact of
civil society agents and in conceptualising the link between civil society and
state democracy in the realm of memory. She argues that the dominant
focus on official and elite discourses in German memory studies ‘mask[s]
a more complex history of bottom-up initiatives and social movements
that – more often than not – do the real work of making memory’.11 The
article will first explore the dominant meanings and practices of Dresden’s
memory culture in the 1990s and early 2000s and examine how Neo-Nazi
groups increasingly sought to appropriate them. The second and third
parts analyse the interventions by a range of civil society groups and the
dynamics of renegotiating commemorative practices between activists and
city officials.
I will argue that civil society memory activists had a profound impact
on local memory culture because they challenged the once hegemonic
practice of ‘stilles Gedenken’ and played a vital role in establishing a more
pluralistic and democratic memoryscape. This change had three main
dimensions. First, it moved from a practice that was once largely officially
sanctioned as a top-down process to one in which grass-roots initiatives
led the way to change by establishing alternative memory practices and
rituals that shaped the make-up of Dresden’s memory culture. Secondly,
due to the interventions by activists, the meaning of ‘victimhood’ and of
Dresden as a symbolic city of victimhood became more diverse and self-
reflective. Finally, it changed from a culture whose main commemorative
practice was originally imagined by its proponents as unpolitical towards
a culture that explicitly acknowledged the inherently political nature of
commemoration.
9 Mathias Berek, ‘Transfer Zones: German and Global Suffering in Dresden’, in Local Memories in a
Nationalizing and Globalizing World, ed. Marnix Beyen, Basingstoke 2015, pp. 72–93.
10 Jenny Wu¨stenberg, Civil Society and Memory in Postwar Germany, Cambridge 2017.
11 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
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DOMINANT LOCAL PRACTICES OF COMMEMORATION AND THEIR APPROPRIATION
BY THE FAR RIGHT
In the 1990s, the main ritual for many Dresdeners became the practice
of ‘stilles Gedenken’. This practice emerged out of an amalgamation of
two separate commemorative practices that were established in the GDR.
The first is the official commemorative ceremony at the memorial to the
victims at Heidefriedhof cemetery on the morning of the anniversary.
Inaugurated in 1948, the memorial emphasised the enormous suffering
and anonymity of countless victims of the bombings while also pointing
out that it was a man-made catastrophe: ‘Wie viele starben? / Wer kennt
die Zahl? / An Deinen Wunden sieht man die Qual / Der Namenlosen
die hier verbrannt / Im Hoellenfeuer aus Menschenhand’. In the 1960s,
local politicians as well as religious and civic groups attended a wreath-
laying service at the site which was followed by short speeches. As the
SED regime’s interest in using the Dresden anniversaries decreased in
the 1970s and early 1980s, official commemorative involvement dwindled
until it was re-established for the fortieth anniversary in 1985.12 At this
time, the second commemorative practice emerged: the gathering of locals
in the city centre to attend church services and to light candles by the
Frauenkirche collectively and silently while the city’s church bells rang to
mark the time the bombings began. This practice emerged first in the
early 1980s and was organised by the nascent GDR peace movement and
Christian groups, who also sought to challenge the overly ritualistic and
politicised ceremonies of the official commemoration at Heidefriedhof.
After 1990, the two practices became part of ‘stilles Gedenken’, which
Fache termed a ‘neues normatives Erinnerungsmodell’.13 Ironically, the
official commemorative practice of the SED regime was fused with what
had originally been designed as a counter-memory, grass-roots initiative
that emerged out of opposition to the top-down anti-fascist myth of the
GDR. The official ceremony had long been embedded as the cornerstone
of local memory culture and allowed greater prominence for government
officials than the grass-roots gathering in the city centre. With its origins
in Protestant church groups and opposition to the GDR, the practice of
a candlelit congregation was a powerful resource of symbolic capital in a
reunified Germany and was quickly appropriated as part of the officially
sanctioned memory culture. It was institutionalised as the ‘urspru¨nglichste,
authentischste erinnerungskulturelle Ritual’.14 By integrating what was
originally a grass-roots initiative, the practice also allowed the post-1990
12 Joel, The Dresden Firebombing (note 5), p. 142.
13 Fache, ‘Gegenwartsbewa¨ltigungen’ (note 7), p. 234.
14 Claudia Jerzak, ‘Der 13. Februar in Dresden’, in ‘Sachsens Demokratie’? Demokratische Kultur und
Erinnerung, Medienlandschaft und U¨berwachungspolitik in Sachsen. Erweiterter Tagungsband zur Tagung
am 20. Januar 2012 in Dresden, ed. Weiterdenken – Heinrich-Bo¨ll-Stiftung Sachsen and Kulturbu¨ro
Sachsen, Dresden 2012, pp. 35–47 (p. 41).
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official commemoration to be imagined as a commemorative tradition with
roots in the GDR opposition and therefore served to give legitimacy to
CDU-dominated local, regional, and national politics.
Although both practices lost some of their original meaning and
character, the ritualised practices themselves largely remained in place and
were filled with new meanings that suited the political objectives of the
new time. Both practices, for different reasons, concentrated on the victims
of the bombings and represented the air raids as brutal and unjustifiable
acts that were thus decontextualised from the wider history of the war
and the Third Reich. Dresden continued to be imagined as Germany’s
foremost ‘Opferstadt’. Such decontextualised remembrance also aided
the consolidation of commemorative discourses in which the suffering in
Dresden was increasingly equated to suffering in war more generally, thus
universalising German suffering.15 This decontextualisation was symbolised
in the widespread use of the term ‘13. Februar’ to refer to the anniversary,
signifying a single historical event on a specific date that was separated
from its historical context. The dominant narratives about the bombings
were based on the myth of an innocent ‘Kunst- und Kulturstadt’ that, more
than any other city, was unnecessarily and unjustifiably destroyed. This myth
had been established by Nazi propaganda in the immediate aftermath of
the bombings and its core was maintained in official memory discourses
in the GDR, through which it become deeply embedded in historical
consciousness.16
‘Stilles Gedenken’ was widely deemed the appropriate practice of a
‘dignified commemoration’. Commemoration was seen as an individual
act of remembering individuals who died in the bombings. Because of its
focus on the suffering of individuals, further accentuated by the increasing
prominence of eyewitnesses in the rituals as well as media representations,
the practice was conceived of as an unpolitical act. It was unthinkable
for advocates of ‘stilles Gedenken’ to ponder the political motivations
underlying the commemoration of the victims or the political meaning and
symbolism it created. The appropriateness of ‘stilles Gedenken’ was taken
for granted and had become an unspoken and uncontroversial assumption.
In 2006, the local daily newspaper, Sa¨chsische Zeitung, demonstrated how
much the practice had been internalised as unquestionable: ‘Die Ruhe,
die Erinnerung, das Gedenken und das stille Mahnen tragen die Dresdner
auf gemeinsamen Veranstaltungen in sich, nicht plakativ vor sich her.’17
In this view, commemoration was a deeply personal, introspective, and
silent act that Dresdeners instinctively understood and knew how to
15 Henning Fischer, ‘Erinnerung’ an und fu¨r Deutschland: Dresden und der 13. Februar 1945 im Geda¨chtnis
der Berliner Republik, Mu¨nster 2011, p. 134.
16 Margalit, ‘Der Luftangriff auf Dresden’ (note 5); Neutzner, ‘Vom Anklagen zum Erinnern’ (note
5).
17 (No author), ‘Gedenken’, Sa¨chsische Zeitung, 10 February 2006.
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carry out in a dignified manner. Any ‘Politisierung’ was rejected as a
‘Vereinnahmung’ or ‘Missbrauch’ of the act of remembrance, and one
that would undermine a dignified commemoration. In 2003, the Sa¨chsische
Zeitung went as far as to say,‘[d]as politische Gedenken entehrt die Opfer’,18
not only separating commemoration from politics but attributing to politics
a harmful influence on commemoration.
The two quotations from the Sa¨chsische Zeitung of 2003 and 2006 indicate
that something had changed insofar as ‘stilles Gedenken’ was no longer
an unquestioned given but a concept that had to be explained and
defended. This was because the hegemonic discourse became increasingly
challenged in these years, largely in response to a growing and more
visible presence of Neo-Nazis at commemorative events and Neo-Nazi
activities in the city and in the state of Saxony. In 1998, local far-
right groups initiated a ‘Trauermarsch’ as their own commemorative
practice, mobilising an ever-increasing number of participants, with 1,000
and 2,700 Neo-Nazis attending marches in 2003 and 2004 respectively.19
Through the ‘Trauermarsch’, far-right groups sought to appropriate the
commemoration of the victims for their own political aims. However, Neo-
Nazis also increasingly joined ‘stilles Gedenken’ practices by participating
in both the official commemorative ceremony at Heidefriedhof and the
candlelit congregations in the city centre. Mingling with mainstream
participants at events of ‘stilles Gedenken’ created the impression that
mainstream and Neo-Nazi mourners shared the same commemorative
space and the same practices, with the effect of legitimising the presence
of Neo-Nazis and thus normalising National Socialist ideas more generally.
Most participants in ‘stilles Gedenken’ activities tolerated the presence
of Neo-Nazis, not least because the self-image of the commemoration as
unpolitical and silent did not permit the expression of political views.
While some had begun to feel uncomfortable with the presence of the
far right, the reluctance to take a political stance and to demarcate the
commemoration politically was thrown into the spotlight in September
2004 when the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) achieved
9.2% in Saxon regional elections and was represented in a German regional
parliament for the first time in over three decades. This came as a
particular shock in Saxony, as the state’s long-serving Minister President
Kurt Biedenkopf had claimed in 2000 that ‘die Sachsen sind immun gegen
Rechtsextremismus’, a claim he has repeated in recent years.20 The Neo-
Nazi party gaining almost one out of ten votes fundamentally called this
projection and self-image into question, alongside the appropriateness of
18 Sa¨chsische Zeitung, 13 February 2003, cited in Fischer, ʻErinnerung’ an und fu¨r Deutschland (note 15),
p. 144.
19 Martin Clemens Winter, ‘Luftkrieg: Akteure und Deutungen des Gedenkens seit 1945’, in
Erinnerungsorte der Extremen Rechten, ed. Martin Langebach and Michael Sturm, Wiesbaden 2015,
pp. 197–212.
20 ‘Kurt, dir wa¨re das nicht passiert!’, interview with Martin Machowiecz, Die Zeit, 5 October 2017.
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Dresden’s commemorative practices. The NPD’s success provided a crucial
catalyst for rethinking commemorative practices, which became a matter
of urgency with the approaching sixtieth anniversary of the bombings in
2005. In late 2004, representatives from a range of civil society groups
agreed on a ‘Rahmen fu¨r das Erinnern’. The framework, endorsed by the
mayor, called for a questioning of ‘unsere[s] Umgang[s] mit diesem Teil
unserer Geschichte’, but also warned against ‘einenmo¨glichenMissbrauch’
of the commemoration.21 The notion of misuse primarily targeted right-
wing extremist ideas but also referred to ‘jede Verho¨hnung der Opfer’,
which was directed at the practices that had been adopted by antifascist
groups.
CHALLENGING THE VICTIMHOOD NARRATIVE: LOCAL ACTIVISM AND THE
CONTROVERSIAL POLITICS OF MEMORY 2004–10
This dominant narrative about the Dresden bombings never went entirely
unchallenged. From the 1990s, antifascist groups continuously criticised
the victimhood myth and historical revisionism and justified, even
welcomed, the air raids on Dresden. Local antifascist groups became
more visible in the commemoration after 2000.22 Their approach was
to provocatively and radically disrupt the hegemonic narratives and
commemorative practices. They had a clear political agenda and sought
to highlight the political nature of commemorative activities.
On a discursive level, they aimed to challenge the notion of Dresden as
an innocent ‘Opferstadt’. In particular, they criticised the fact that local
narratives disconnected the bombings from the history of the Third Reich
and the earlier stages of the Second World War. Typical slogans included:
‘Den deutschen Opfermythos im Visier’ (2004), ‘No tears for Krauts’
(2005), and ‘Deutsche Ta¨terInnen sind keine Opfer’ (2006–10).23 Through
such interventions, antifascist activists challenged the decontextualised
‘stilles Gedenken’ and aimed to draw greater attention to Dresden’s
history of complicity in Nazi crimes and their perpetration. Antifascist
activism gained momentum in 2003 and 2004, when narratives of German
victimhood gained new prominence in the wider discursive shifts in
German memory culture following the debates over Gu¨nter Grass’s Im
Krebsgang and Jo¨rg Friedrich’s Der Brand. In 2004, the Dresden antifascist
group venceremos criticised the ‘grassierende Opferdiskurs’, in which
Dresden played ‘eine Vorreiterrolle [...] durch die konsensuale o¨ffentliche
21 ‘Rahmen fu¨r das Erinnern’ (2004), https://www.dresden.de/media/pdf/13 februar text erinneru
ng.pdf (accessed 20 August 2018).
22 Teile der sogenannten Gruppe venceremos, ‘Provokation als Mittel: “Wir danken den Alliierten
fu¨r die Zerschlagung Nazideutschlands”’, in Gedenken Abschaffen. Kritik am Diskurs zur Bombardierung
Dresdens 1945, ed. Autor innenkollektiv Dissonanz, Berlin 2013, pp. 217–22.
23 Autor innenkollektiv Dissonanz, Gedenken Abschaffen (note 22), p. 321.
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Darstellung der Opferhaltung am zum Symbol gemachten 13. Februar’.24
They denounced what they perceived as the ‘Dresdner Opferkonsens’ in
which German responsibility for the war and the Holocaust were pushed
aside.25
Antifascist interventions also aimed to problematise the political
dimension of the anniversary and draw attention to the Neo-Nazi
‘Trauermarsch’. The trivialisation of German perpetration as a result
of universalising suffering and victimhood made it possible to portray
Germany ‘als historisch gela¨utert’.26 Such a position would go hand in hand
with the desire for a more assertive articulation of German national identity,
which antifascist campaigners sought to undermine and which the slogan
‘Keine Verso¨hnung mit Deutschland’, used in the 2009 and 2010 Dresden
campaigns, made explicit.27 Antifascists politicised the presence of the
far right at mainstream commemorative rituals, accusing city officials and
citizens of wallowing in mourning and self-pity, and of failing to sufficiently
demarcate commemorative rituals from Neo-Nazi activities. They intended
to unmask the ignorance and naivety of the mainstream that would allow
the far right to portray themselves as part of the mainstream, thereby
exploiting the events as their political and anniversary capital.28
While antifascist slogans and their linking of the commemoration
to political agendas already had the potential for controversy, their
counter-commemorative practices proved even more provocative. In the
early 2000s, adopted practices served primarily as ‘Gedenkkritik’ and
aimed to disrupt and ridicule the silent and solemn mourning rituals
of ‘stilles Gedenken’. Such practices included a commemorative rally
for Bomber Harris, a Britpop party, and offering English breakfast as
celebrations of the military and cultural achievements of the Allied
powers to express their anti-German sentiments. Other practices such
as champagne receptions, carnival parties, and vociferous disruptions
of ‘stilles Gedenken’ rituals were playful performative acts designed
to mark the very antithesis to the mainstream commemoration. As a
2003 leaflet stated, ‘wir [...] lassen uns nicht die Laune verderben von
24 ‘Den deutschen Opfermythos im Visier: Gegen jeden Geschichtsrevisionismus’, https://web.
archive.org/web/20041227034639/http://www.venceremos.antifa.net/13februar/2004/demonstration.
html (accessed 20 August 2018).
25 ‘Keine Tra¨ne fu¨r Dresden: Aufruf der autonomen antifa Dresden’, February 2005, https://web.
archive.org/web/20060106022226/http://venceremos.antifa.net/13februar/2005/aufruf.pdf (accessed
12 June 2019).
26 Ibid.
27 Posters reprinted in Autor innenkollektiv Dissonanz, Gedenken Abschaffen (note 22), pp. 331 and
333.
28 ‘Wir danken den Alliierten fu¨r die milita¨rische Zerschlagung Nazideutschlands’, February 2002,
https://web.archive.org/web/20041130230847/http://www.venceremos.antifa.net/13februar/2002/wi
rdankentext.html (accessed 12 June 2019).
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kerzenschwingenden Betroffenheits-Deutschen’.29 From 2004 onwards,
the focus of antifascist practices gradually moved from humorous
performative disruptions of ‘stilles Gedenken’ to organising political
demonstrations against the Neo-Nazi ‘Trauermarsch’. It therefore shifted
from provocatively criticising mainstream commemorative practices to
disturbing and ultimately frustrating Neo-Nazi activities. This shift was
significant as it made these forms of protest potentially more acceptable
to the more left-leaning parts of the mainstream.30
Among the majority of local politicians and citizens, however, their
interventions were widely deemed radical, inappropriate, and undignified,
with regard to both content and form. In 2005, an exchange between
locals and a group of antifascist protesters holding a banner reading ‘60
Jahre Trauer um Dresden – 60 Jahre Trauer um den Nationalsozialismus’
is revealing: a local challenged the protesters, saying, ‘Scha¨mt ihr euch
nicht, uns in den Dreck zu ziehen?’, to which a protester responded,
‘Dort dru¨ben marschieren die Nazis! Die zerren euch vor aller Welt in
den Dreck!’.31 This exchange shows that more was at stake in the memory
contest than simply the appropriateness of commemorative practices. It was
also about the weight attributed to the wider historical context in which the
bombings should be placed and questions of historical responsibility for
the bombings. These antifascist interventions, while having little immediate
impact on commemorative practices, were nonetheless important in
formulating a counter-discourse that problematised Dresden as an
‘Opferstadt’. By contextualising the bombings in the wider history of the
Second World War and the Nazi regime, they regarded the bombings as a
direct and necessary consequence of German support for the Nazi regime
and justified, even glorified, the bombings.
While the annual anniversaries of the bombings between 1995 and 2005
were mostly a local affair, the sixtieth anniversary in 2005 turned the
commemorative events into a nation-wide memory contest. National and
international attention had already been focused on Dresden a month
before the anniversary during a commemorative event in the Saxon
parliament on the occasion of Holocaust Memorial Day. The leader of the
NPD parliamentary group, Holger Apfel, spoke of the ‘Opfer des alliierten
Bombenterrors’ and claimed that the bombings of Dresden represented
a ‘kaltblu¨tig geplanter industrieller Massenmord’ that was ignored in
29 Antifa Dresden, ‘Aufruf zum Karneval: Gute Laune gegen schlechte Angewohnheiten’, January
2003, https://web.archive.org/web/20050106185325/http://venceremos.antifa.net/13februar/2003/tx
t01.html (accessed 12 June 2019).
30 Venceremos, ‘Provokation als Mittel’ (note 22), p. 219.
31 Cited in Harald Lachmann, ‘Die Stadt Dresden lebt in ihrem Schmerz’, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 14
February 2005.
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Germany’s ‘Su¨hnekultur’ and ‘nationale[r] Selbstvergessenheit’.32 Drawing
on a well-established trope frequently used in GDR propaganda, Apfel
referred to the bombings as an act of terrorism, but also equated
the bombings with the Holocaust by speaking of planned industrial
mass murder. His fellow NPD parliamentarian Ju¨rgen Gansel made this
even more explicit by using the term ‘Bomben-Holocaust’ in the same
parliamentary debate.33 The NPD’s calculated provocation caused an
outcry in the national and international media34 and heightened the
expectations for the sixtieth anniversary of the Dresden bombings just
three weeks later.
Following the NPD’s provocation, the German public debated the
renaissance of Neo-Nazi ideology. The Frankfurter Rundschau stated, ‘[d]er
Konsens des “Nie wieder” ist durchlo¨chert’, the Spiegel spoke of an
‘Aufstand der Unansta¨ndigen’, and the Welt deemed the ‘Ehre der Nation’
to be threatened.35 Following the NPD’s intervention, the anniversary
became explicitly framed as a political event of national significance – what
was at stake was nothing less than the defence of German democracy
against the challenge from the anti-democratic far right. The Frankfurter
Rundschau called on democratic forces to stand united by identifying and
defending the ‘Standort der Demokraten’, while theWelt am Sonntag raised
the spectre of Weimar when it asked Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der, ‘Haben
wir Weimarer Verha¨ltnisse?’,36 implying there was the threat of a takeover
by the far right. In the interview, Schro¨der argued in relation to the
bombings that: ‘[m]an darf die Verantwortlichkeiten nicht verwischen. [...]
Wir werden auch nicht zulassen, daß Ursache und Wirkung vertauscht
werden’.37 The very occurrence of the German head of government
intervening in a local memory contest demonstrated the importance
attributed to the anniversary and the political issues – and capital – at
stake. Such framing in national media and political discourse endowed
the anniversary with political significance. Dresden’s anniversary capital in
2005 derived precisely from linking the memory of the bombings to the
32 Sa¨chsischer Landtag, Plenarprotokoll 4/8, 21 January 2005, pp. 460, 461, http://edas.landtag.
sachsen.de/viewer.aspx?dok nr=8&dok art=PlPr&leg per=4&pos dok=201&dok id=undefined
(accessed 10 April 2019).
33 Ibid., p. 463.
34 E.g. Sven Heitkamp, ‘Der kalkulierte Skandal’, Die Welt, 25 January 2005; Ian Traynor, ‘Dresden
parliament in uproar at neo-Nazi outburst’, The Guardian, 22 January 2005, https://www.thegua
rdian.com/world/2005/jan/22/secondworldwar.thefarright (accessed 7 June 2020).
35 StephanHebel, ‘Standort der Demokraten’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 25 January 2005; Roland Nelles
and Gabor Steingard, Der Spiegel, 31 January 2005; Eckhard Fuhr, ‘Die Ehre der Nation’, Die Welt, 11
February 2005.
36 Gu¨nther Lachmann, Christoph Keese, and Christian Reiermannm, ‘Haben wir Weimarer
Verha¨ltnisse, Herr Bundeskanzler?’, Die Welt am Sonntag, 13 February 2005, https://www.welt.de/
print-wams/article123096/Haben-wir-Weimarer-Verhaeltnisse-Herr-Bundeskanzler.html (accessed 7
June 2020).
37 Ibid.
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confrontation with a resurgent far right. While Schro¨der’s intervention
was primarily directed at the Neo-Nazi ‘Trauermarsch’, it also addressed
the historical narrative and political silence advocated by the supporters of
‘stilles Gedenken’, which had increasingly become problematic.
More than 5,000 Neo-Nazis joined the 2005 ‘Trauermarsch’, rendering
the rally the largest of the European far right since 1945. With only 100
or 150 antifascist protesters, who aimed to block the Neo-Nazi rally, and
about 50,000 participants in ‘stilles Gedenken’ activities, the framing of
the anniversary in the national media as an important political contest
appears to have left no mark on official local commemorative practices.38
However, local memory activists increasingly deployed this framing of the
anniversary as a politically significant event and challenged the dominant
commemorative practices by establishing alternative grass-roots practices
in two main ways. First, they campaigned for a greater recognition
of Jewish suffering, thereby changing the conception of victimhood in
the anniversary commemoration. Secondly, local civil society groups also
fought for a more politically outspoken commemoration that turned the
anniversary into a public statement against the far right.
The greater recognition of Jewish victimhood in commemorative
activities and the city’s memory culture more generally occurred through
two initiatives. ‘GeDenken’, a network of mainly religious groups, trade
unions, and left-wing political parties, aimed to integrate the historical
context into the narrative about the bombings in order to accentuate the
wider historical causes of the bombings.39 The annual event organised
by the network between 2001 and 2007 included a sharing of stories by
eyewitnesses of the bombings. On two occasions, the life stories of Jewish
survivors were included, for whom the bombings ensured their escape
from deportation and thus survival. In 2004, the organisers invited the
Holocaust survivor and Israeli peace activist Reuven Moskovitz to speak at
the event.40 Although ‘GeDenken’ was criticised for lacking a more explicit
political position, it established a counter-commemorative practice that was
envisaged as an alternative to ‘stilles Gedenken’ and marked a first, if only
hesitant, challenge to the discursive construction of victimhood by writing
the hitherto omitted suffering of Dresden’s Jews into the narrative.
This writing-in of Jewish life into Dresden’s memoryscape increased
further during the second half of the first decade of the 2000s through the
initiative ‘Denkzeichen’. Conceptualised by the Gesellschaft fu¨r Christlich-
Ju¨dische Zusammenarbeit (CJ) in 2006, it aims to recover and make visible
‘ju¨dische[s] Leben und Leiden in der Zeit der nationalsozialistischen
38 (No author), ‘Dresden trotz den Neo-Nazis’, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 14 February 2005.
39 Jerzak, ‘Gedenken’ (note 8), p. 124.
40 Ibid.
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Herrschaft’41 through the installation of information panels at sites
of Jewish life and persecution across the city. The initiative’s desire,
formulated in the mission statement, ‘die Erinnerungskultur der Stadt
[zu] bereichern’ suggests it was intended as a deliberate intervention to
diversify local memory culture. Through developing a more complex and
diverse understanding of victimhood, both ‘GeDenken’ and ‘Denkzeichen’
represent counter-memorials that seek to challenge the dominant narrative
of air-raid victimhood.
The local Jewish community also exposed the inherently problematic
nature of silent and apolitical commemorative practices. The absence of
an unambiguous political position of ‘GeDenken’ was the reason for the
withdrawal of Jewish activists. The most significant intervention occurred in
2008 when the Jewish community decided to no longer participate in the
official commemoration ceremony at Heidefriedhof. Nora Goldenbogen,
the community’s leader, found it ‘nicht mehr ertra¨glich’ to take part
alongside Neo-Nazis, whose presence at the ceremony had increased
over the years.42 The withdrawal of the Jewish community was of high
symbolic significance. It intensified the call for a clear political message
to be articulated at commemorative rituals but also for the widening
of discursive space to consider alternative practices. Matthias Neutzner,
an important local grass-roots memory activist, also criticised the official
ceremony for being devoid of a clear political position, quipping that the
dominant commemorative practice was not ‘ein stilles, sondern [...] ein
sprachloses Gedenken’.43 The response by Dresden’s acting mayor Lutz
Vogel revealed how deeply embedded the idea of the apolitical nature of
the ‘stilles Gedenken’ was: ‘Ich kann mir leider nicht aussuchen, mit wem
ich gedenke’.44
The second main development in the second half of the decade was the
greater politicisation of the anniversary by left-leaning activists who devised
new commemorative events that explicitly linked the anniversary of the
bombings to the fight against right-wing extremism. After the first anti-Neo-
Nazi demonstration on the anniversary in 2004, organised by the Bu¨ndnis
Dresden gegen Rechts and supported by the mayor, a wider range of local
activists initiated ‘GehDenken’. Although many of the same local groups
who were involved in ‘GeDenken’ supported ‘GehDenken’, the initiatives
differed significantly, mainly with regard to the outspoken political position
of ‘GehDenken’. The play on the word ‘Gedenken’ appeals not only to
critical thought (‘denken’), it also adds an activist dimension (‘Geh’) to
41 CJ-Dresden, ‘Denkzeichen zur Erinnerung an ju¨disches Leben und Leiden im
Nationalsozialismus’, https://web.archive.org/web/20160417151315/http://www.cj-dresden.de/index.
php?id=164 (accessed 20 August 2018).
42 Cited in Hendrik Lasch, ‘Das “sprachlose Gedenken” hat ausgedient’, Neues Deutschland, 13
February 2008.
43 Ibid.
44 Cited in dpa, ‘Dresdner Kritik am Gedenken’, Berliner Zeitung, 14 February 2008.
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the commemoration of the anniversaries. From 2005 to 2009, ‘GehDenken’
organised political demonstrations and rallies against the ‘Trauermarsch’
and the presence of right-wing extremism in the city more generally. It was
supported by the SPD, the Greens, Die Linke.PDS, trade unions, and a wide
range of religious, political, educational, and environmental groups.
‘GehDenken’ intervened in local memory culture by challenging
the narratives, self-image, and practices of the hegemonic ‘stilles
Gedenken’. The group campaigned for a historical contextualisation of the
bombings, which included a clear statement on historical responsibility,
and emphasised the racial dimension of the Second World War and
the Holocaust. The 2007 appeal, for example, stated that citizens,
‘erinnern damit gleichzeitig an die Ursachen des Krieges, der von der
Gewaltherrschaft der deutschen Nationalsozialisten ausging und Europa
mit Rassismus und Rassenmord insbesondere an den europa¨ischen Juden
u¨berzog’.45 In 2009, ‘GehDenken’ activists also criticised the tendency to
universalise German victimhood through equating the victims of Allied air
raids to victims of either German military campaigns or of Nazi persecution
and genocide.46
The more obvious and more important contribution that ‘GehDenken’
made was, however, the appropriation of the anniversary for the fight
against the far right. In doing so, the organisers called into question the
self-image of advocates of ‘stilles Gedenken’. The 2007 appeal established
a direct connection between the memory of the past and the politics of the
present: ‘Gedenken heißt auch, gegen Nazis aktiv Stellung zu beziehen’.47
The positioning against the Neo-Nazi march was also clear through the
practice of lighting thousands of candles to spell the slogan ‘Diese Stadt
hat Nazis satt’ as the culmination of the protest, often against the backdrop
of the historic city centre. It represented an attempt to appropriate the
practice of lighting candles, used in ‘stilles Gedenken’, to communicate a
clear political message. While it remained a grass-roots initiative by local
activists, it attracted increasing levels of support from national political and
anti-racist organisations and artists. In 2009, the former President Richard
von Weizsa¨cker and the President of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse,
as well as national party leaders Franz Mu¨ntefering (SPD), Claudia Roth
(Greens), and Gregor Gysi (Linke) joined the demonstration. The support
lent by leading national political and cultural figures demonstrated the
political significance attributed to the anniversary, likely increased due to
European, federal, and regional elections taking place later in the year.
Substantial anniversary capital could be mobilised on this occasion because
45 ‘Geh Denken! Fu¨r Demokratie und gegen Rechtsextremismus am 13. Februar 2007’, appeal 2007,
https://web.archive.org/web/20070911103837/http://www.kulturbuero-sachsen.de/dokumente/Geh
denken2.pdf (accessed 15 August 2018).
46 ‘Aufruf’, December 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20081227050559/http://www.geh-denken.
de/aufruf.htm (accessed 12 June 2019).
47 ‘Fu¨r Demokratie und gegen Rechtsextremismus’ (note 45).
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civil society groups succeeded in framing the anniversary as a political event
of national relevance by establishing meaningful connections between the
anniversary and wider political agendas at the national level and even at an
international level, as the support from several MEPs and European human
rights campaigners demonstrated.48
It was precisely this effective politicisation which caused controversy
at the local level. The local branches of the CDU and FDP felt
unable to support ‘GehDenken’ because they had reservations about the
appropriateness of its commemorative practices. Lars Rohwer, chair of
the local CDU branch, equated ‘GehDenken’ with the ‘Trauermarsch’
because both represented a disruption of the commemoration ‘in Stille
und Wu¨rde’.49 Rohwer’s disagreement went deeper than merely accusing
the left of exploiting the anniversary for political purposes. He felt that
any vocal political demonstration on the anniversary was distasteful and
disrespectful of the victims of the bombings: ‘Wir Dresdner brauchen an
diesem Tag keine zu Rockmusik tanzenden Linken auf dem Opernplatz!
Das ist eine Verho¨hnung der Opfer.’50 Until 2009, the anniversaries
remained a divisive local memory contest because political groups
disagreed over the appropriateness of commemorative practices and the
extent of political positioning that was deemed necessary to counter Neo-
Nazi mobilisation.
Nevertheless, 2009 marked an important shift in the meaning and
practice of the anniversary. The debate moved increasingly towards
questioning the suitability of ‘stilles Gedenken’ in the face of the increasing
numbers of Neo-Nazi marchers. Parts of the political right became more
open-minded about other forms of commemoration. Rohwer’s fellow
CDU politician Patrick Schreiber, for example, welcomed the high level
of participation in counter-protests, which sent ‘ein deutliches Signal
gegen den braunen Sumpf und dessen Geschichtsverfa¨lschung’.51 The
Sa¨chsische Zeitung, a keen defender of ‘stilles Gedenken’ in previous years,
now reflected differently on the effectiveness of other commemorative
practices in fighting right-wing extremism, and concluded that ‘Ruhe und
Besinnung’ had become inadequate.52 The paper also ran a feature on
how other cities had dealt with far-right rallies, with all cited examples
succeeding in stopping such rallies through creative forms of civil
48 See the statements collected on the organisation’s website, ‘Ein klares Stopp zum
Rechtsextremismus-Geh Denken Dresden’, Aufruf 2009; https://web.archive.org/web/
20090403002258/http://geh-denken.de/joomla/statements.html (accessed 20 June 2019).
49 ‘Dresdner Union zum Gedenken am 13. Februar und den Aktionen am 14. Februar 2009’,
CDU Dresden, https://web.archive.org/web/20090221094029/http://www.cdu-dresden.de/de/presse/
pressemeldungen/?iso=e5f4e (accessed 20 June 2019).
50 Thilo Alexe, ‘CDU-Chef kritisiert linke Demonstration’, Sa¨chsische Zeitung, 16 February 2009.
51 Oliver Reinhard, ‘Was brauchen “wir Dresdner” im Februar 2010?’, Sa¨chsische Zeitung, 18 February
2009.
52 Ibid.
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disobedience and blockades.53 Ultimately, national media attention made
the anniversary an evenmore important and visible memory event. By 2009,
the meaning of ‘13. Februar’ had shifted from a site of national memory
to a site in which the political debate over how to confront right-wing
extremism was fought out.
CHANGING THE POLITICS OF VICTIMHOOD: DRESDEN MEMORY AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST RACISM AND NEO-NAZISM AFTER 2010
While events in the years before 2010 indicated some important shifts
in commemorative discourses and practices, it was only in the following
decade that these changed more fundamentally. 2010 and 2011 saw the
emergence of four new commemorative practices which built on the
discursive shifts that had taken place in previous years. All four were
initiated by, or at least linked to, civil society groups, all left their mark
on the historical narratives, and all explicitly linked the commemoration
of the bombings to political agendas in the present. These initiatives
and the dynamics of renegotiation between civil society groups and city
officials effected significant changes that would ultimately translate into a
comprehensive overhaul of local memory culture.
Two of the new practices were characterised by their predominant
objective of taking a stand against far-right extremism, although they
adopted radically different means. First, the ‘Menschenkette’ was an
officially sponsored human chain around the city centre and represented a
highly symbolic commemorative practice. It resulted from a joint initiative
by city officials, represented by the mayor, and a large network of civil
society groups, including political parties, trade unions, anti-racist activists,
and higher education organisations. The ‘Menschenkette’ soon became
a highly effective means of demonstrating the unity of city officials and
many civil society groups, and created a powerful symbolic practice. In an
era of increasing visualisation of memory culture, it achieves its potential,
and mobilises its capital, precisely because it is set against the backdrop
of Dresden’s historic city centre, and the iconic skyline at night creates
arresting visual material for use by both traditional and social media.
The Frankfurter Rundschau remarked that the ‘Menschenkette’ produced
‘pra¨chtige Fernsehbilder’, even though it did not stop the Neo-Nazi
‘Trauermarsch’.54
What ultimately prevented the ‘Trauermarsch’ in 2010 was the second
new commemorative practice: the active blockade of the Neo-Nazi rally
by Dresden Nazifrei activists. The initiative defined its objective as: ‘[uns]
53 Claudia Parton, ‘Wie andere Sta¨dte mit großen Neonazi-Demos fertig werden’, Sa¨chsische Zeitung,
18 February 2009.
54 Bernhard Honnigfort, ‘Dresdner Dilemma’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 January 2011.
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durch Aktionen des zivilen Ungehorsam mit Massenblockaden den Nazis
entgegen stellen und sie blockieren’,55 and was supported by a range of
antifascist groups and political parties on the left. For the Tagesspiegel,
the blockade represented a ‘schwere Niederlage des Rechtsextremismus
in Deutschland’, and it congratulated activists on their ‘großen Erfolg
fu¨r die [...] Demokratie im Osten’ that marked a ‘historische[s] Signal’.56
After 2010, the blockade attracted wider popular support from a growing
number of civil society groups, leading politicians, and other religious and
cultural figures. Although the blockades remained a controversial practice
on legal and political grounds, they have largely found a positive reception.
73% of local citizens surveyed in 2012 thought that blockades against Neo-
Nazi marches were justified and Dresden Nazifrei won the 2012 Sa¨chsische
Fo¨rderpreis fu¨r Demokratie awarded by the Amadeu Antonio Stiftung.
The two other new commemorative practices represent more specifically
counter-memory initiatives that aimed to challenge the narratives about
the bombings. The first is ‘Vergessene Erinnerung’, an event designed
by Jewish and anti-racism groups as well as by the CJ. The event,
a commemorative ceremony at Neustadt railway station from which
Dresden’s Jewish population was deported, aims to resurrect the forgotten
memory of Jewish suffering. In particular, the initiative seeks to remember
the fact that air raids on the city prevented the last deportations, which were
scheduled for 16 February 1945,57 thus saving the lives of the remaining
Dresden Jews, including Victor Klemperer. The annual appeals lament
the marginalisation of the memory of Jewish life and persecution in the
city’s memoryscape. The organisers’ aim is for key sites of Jewish suffering
to become ‘sta¨rker in der Dresdner Erinnerungskultur verankert’.58 This
new commemorative practice represented an important step for activists to
improve the visibility of Jewish perspectives in local memory discourses.
The final new practice is the guided tour ‘Ta¨terspuren’, which was
first conceived in 2011 by Dresden Nazifrei activists and takes place on
the day of the anniversary. It aims to make hitherto invisible traces of
Nazi perpetration visible by visiting local sites of political, administrative,
judicial, cultural, military, financial, or religious institutions that were
key to the functioning of the Nazi dictatorship or demonstrated popular
support for Nazi policies. By highlighting sites of perpetration, the group
seeks to undermine the dominant commemoration of Dresden as a city
of universal victimhood: ‘Wir wollen den Blickwinkel auf diesen Tag
a¨ndern. Vor der Momentaufnahme des 13.2. verblasst die jahrelange
55 Aufruf des Bu¨ndnisses Dresden Nazifrei (2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20100127140431/
http://www.dresden-nazifrei.com/?page id=590 (accessed 15 August 2018).
56 Frank Jansen, ‘Dresden: Wo Bu¨rger gegen Nazis siegen’, Tagesspiegel, 15 February 2010.
57 Jerzak, ‘13. Februar’ (note 14), pp. 43–4.
58 ‘Vergessene Erinnerung: Veranstaltung zum Gedenken an die ermordeten Dresdner Juden und
Ju¨dinnen’ (2011), http://www.pressebuero-naumann.de/13.Februar/Kulturbuero.HTM (accessed 2
May 2019).
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NS-Geschichte von Dresden [...] Wir wollen die Spuren der Ta¨terinnen und
Ta¨ter aufnehmen und dabei einen Teil zu einer Sichtbarwerdung dieser
Dresdner Geschichte leisten.’59 Its main focus is the establishment of a
counter-narrative to contextualise the bombings in a historical trajectory
of perpetrators and perpetration. Since 2014, ‘Ta¨terspuren’ has been
included in the official commemorative calendar for the anniversary,
thereby achieving an enhanced status that provides activists with officially
allocated anniversary capital.
Both ‘Vergessene Erinnerung’ and ‘Ta¨terspuren’ were important
counter-memory interventions which propagated a widening of historical
narratives on the bombings to include marginalised victim groups and
create greater awareness of perpetration. This growing ambiguity and
diversity of victimhood can also be observed in other commemorative
practices. Dresden Nazifrei’s mission statement accused the ‘Trauermarsch’
of denying Nazi crimes and portraying Germans as the ‘eigentlichen Opfer’
of the war, to conclude emphatically: ‘Wir aber wissen: der verbrecherische
Krieg ging von Nazi-Deutschland aus und kehrte 1945 nach Dresden
zuru¨ck’.60 For Dresden Nazifrei activists, the historical responsibility for the
bombings rested firmly with Nazi Germany. In some interesting respects,
the 2011 joint appeal by the mayor and civil society groups went further
than the Dresden Nazifrei statement. It argued: ‘Wir schließen in unser
Gedenken die Millionen Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen und
des Zweiten Weltkriegs ein. Wir erinnern an die historische Verantwortung,
die auch unsere Stadt fu¨r diese Verbrechen und diesen Krieg tra¨gt.’61
This represented a significant shift in tone and emphasis compared to
the wording of the 2010 appeal, which said that the commemoration
of the bombings should include ‘das Verbrechen des von Deutschland
ausgegangenen Krieges’.62 The 2010 wording included a vague expression
of unspecified crimes during the war and diluted the question of
responsibility through the ambiguous phrasing of the war emanating from
Germany. The 2011 appeal tackled these issues more explicitly and in more
detail.
Alongside the changing meaning of victimhood and the historical
narratives of the bombings, the anniversaries witnessed a more conscious
politicisation after 2010. The blockades of Neo-Nazi marches remained
a controversial issue and were fiercely debated by the Saxon regional
59 Ta¨terspuren leaflet 2013, https://archiv.dresden-nazifrei.com/images/stories/material/2013/flyer
mahngang 2013.pdf (accessed 12 May 2020).
60 Aufruf des Bu¨ndnisses Dresden Nazifrei (note 55).
61 ‘Gemeinsamer Aufruf zum 13. Februar 2011’, press release 15 December 2010, https://www.
dresden.de/de/rathaus/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/archiv/2010/12/pm 071.php (accessed 15
August 2018).
62 ‘Erinnern und Handeln. Fu¨r mein Dresden’, press release, 11 February 2010, https://www.
dresden.de/de/rathaus/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/archiv/2010/02/pm 034.php (accessed 15
August 2018).
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parliament on several occasions in 2011. On one side of the argument,
CDU and FDP representatives condemned the use of violence by left-wing
extremists and defended the intervention by the police force to contain
violence and safeguard the constitutional right of Neo-Nazi organisations
to march. Volker Bandmann of the CDU argued that ‘[d]er Rechtsstaat
gilt eben nicht nur fu¨r die Guten, [er] gilt auch fu¨r die Schlechten. Er gilt
sogar fu¨r Nazis, und er gilt auch fu¨r Linksradikale’.63 On the other side
of the argument, the parties on the political left complained about the
criminalisation and undue obstruction of left-wing activists by politicians
and the police and defended the right to civil disobedience, which
included the peaceful protest against Neo-Nazi marches. The Green MP
Johannes Lichdi accused the governing parties: ‘Sie wollen den Widerstand
gegen die Nazis delegitimieren und abwu¨rgen’.64 As in previous years, the
sticking points were the appropriateness of commemorative practices and
acceptable forms of protest. What Saxon parliamentarians, and the wider
public, negotiated in these debates was the boundary between the space
of legal and justifiable civil society protest on the one hand and the legal
duties and interference by state authorities on the other. Stakeholders of
different political persuasions projected competing political agendas onto
the anniversary, mobilising political and anniversary capital. As a result, the
political nature of the anniversaries became evident.
At a local level, activists and, more importantly, city officials also
acknowledged the politics of memory and attributed political significance
to the commemoration. From 2011, the anniversaries were increasingly
linked explicitly to the defence of fundamental political values.
The slogan adopted for the ‘Menschenkette’ in the first two years,
‘Erinnern und handeln. Fu¨r eine weltoffene Stadt. Gegen Gewalt und
Fremdenfeindlichkeit’ indicates how much the meaning of the anniversary
and the contemporary relevance attributed to the bombings in particular
had shifted. It marks a powerful statement that remembrance is not solely
focused on the past but inherently interlinked with action in the present,
thus conceiving of commemoration in similar terms as ‘GehDenken’ did
before 2010. Furthermore, the slogan clarifies what the contemporary
relevance for action in the present constitutes: cosmopolitanism and anti-
racism. The past is invoked and made usable as a reminder of specific
values in the present. The 2011 joint appeal also calls for a ‘verantwortliches
Erinnern’ compared to the peaceful, silent, or dignified commemoration
of previous years.65 The discursive frame of silent commemoration gave way
to responsible remembering by 2011 – an important semantic shift which
indicated the decline of the once dominant commemorative practice.
63 Sa¨chsischer Landtag, Plenarprotokoll 5/32, 23 March 2011, p. 3032.
64 Ibid., p. 3036.
65 ‘Gemeinsamer Aufruf’ (note 61).
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In the following years, and in consultation with relevant civil society
groups, city officials deliberated over changes to Dresden’s memory
culture. A key player in this process was the ‘Arbeitsgruppe (AG) 13.
Februar’, installed by the mayor in 2009, which gathered representatives
from local political parties and activist organisations. The AG developed
a ‘Grundkonsens’ in 2011 and a city council committee on memory
culture proposed a new ‘Gedenkkonzept’ in 2014, eventually ushering
in a decentralisation of the city’s commemorative practices in 2016. In
February 2016, the city began to pluralise commemorative practices. The
heavily ritualised and problematic ceremony at Heidefriedhof was no
longer the main official commemorative event. Instead, the city aimed to
decentralise the commemorative culture. Alongside the traditional ritual
at Heidefriedhof, four other commemorative sites were integrated, with
a different leading politician attending one of each: the memorial to the
children of forced labourers at the St Pauli cemetery, the Neustadt railway
station from which Dresden Jews were deported, the memorial to the
victims of euthanasia at the Tolkewitz cemetery, and the memorial to the
victims of the Allied air raids and the graves of Soviet POWs at the Mattha¨us
cemetery. This transformation in 2016 was facilitated by changing political
circumstances, such as the election of the new mayor Dirk Hilbert (FDP) in
2015 and a new left-wing majority in the city council in the same year. The
changing practices adopted in 2016 were, by and large, a combination and
culmination of the three main trends and shifts that this article identified in
the preceding decade and, arguably, represented their institutionalisation.
First, grass-roots activists have been recognised as crucial and
indispensable stakeholders in Dresden’s memory culture. Civil society
activists from a range of religious, political, and anti-racist organisations
served as members of the AG and contributed to the conceptualisation
of commemorative activities and the drafting of appeals for the
‘Menschenkette’. The 2014 ‘Gedenkkonzept’ acknowledged the
contribution and significance of civil society agents: ‘Der Stadtrat
und die Stadtverwaltung entwickeln gemeinsam mit zivilgesellschaftlichen
Akteuren die sta¨dtischen Gedenkformen weiter’.66 It accepts that civil
society activists and groups have a role to play in the city’s memory culture
and that their role is on a par with the input of city officials. A key
characteristic of the decentralised memory culture is that the city invited
civil society groups to take ownership for the organisation of individual
events. Hilbert’s justification for the change is remarkable: ‘Wir brauchen
dort [Heidefriedhof] aber keine Rituale mehr, in denen die “Obrigkeit”
66 ‘“Erinnerung vielfa¨ltig gestalten” – Erinnerungskulturelle Grundlagen der Landeshauptstadt
Dresden’, Anlage zur Stadtratssitzung 19 June 2014, http://ratsinfo.dresden.de/get
file.php?id=165087&type=do& (accessed 10 June 2019), my emphasis.
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den Dresdnern das Gedenken erkla¨rt’.67 Hilbert rejects the patronising
top-down commemorative practices of previous years. While city officials
continue to participate in commemoration events, they, importantly,
yielded ground to non-official agents.
Secondly, a plurality of voices and narratives has been accepted, perhaps
even celebrated. An important part of the AG’s ‘Grundkonsens’ of 2011
was the commitment not to evaluate the views or practices of other
members as ‘moralisch ho¨herwertiger’ than one’s own.68 The plurality
of positions was tolerated at least. The city’s ‘Gedenkkonzept’ of 2014
went beyond the tolerance of diverging views and instead celebrated such
diversity and embraced the potential they might unlock: ‘Unterschiedliche
Auffassungen von Geschichte werden als Chance verstanden. Sie sollen
den Blick fu¨r andere Sichtweisen o¨ffnen und dazu beitragen, diese zu
respektieren.’69 This represented nothing less than an official recognition
of a legitimate plurality of voices and narratives, and a revocation of
the hegemonic commemorative monoculture of the 1990s and early
2000s. This acknowledgment of the complexity and ambiguity of historical
narratives was enshrined through the decentralisation of commemoration.
Hilbert paid tribute to the diversification that needed to reflect adequately
who is included in the commemoration by arguing ‘[w]enn man zeigen
will, wie vielschichtig das historische Ereignis ist, muss man auch andere,
teils vergessene oder unbequeme Gedenkorte einbeziehen’.70 While there
had already been a gradual shift in previous years to include victims of Nazi
persecution, these moves remained rhetorical. The inclusion of multiple
memorial sites, most of which were dedicated specifically to victims of
persecution, marks an important symbolic shift through the change of
commemorative practice as it removes the hierarchy between different
victim groups.
The third and perhaps most radical shift was a rethinking of the
fundamental assumptions that inform commemorative practice, and a
move from amerely imagined apolitical understanding towards a politically
conscious memory culture. This had already been more widely accepted
through the pro-tolerance and anti-racist political message endorsed by
the ‘Menschenkette’. The 2014 ‘Gedenkkonzept’ called into question
the appropriateness of ritualised commemorations and encouraged the
exploration of more discursive formats. The significance of such a shift lay
in making transparent the inherently political motivations that underpin
any commemoration: ‘Statt einer bloß historisierten Ru¨ckschau soll nach
67 Cited in ‘Dresden am 13. Februar’, Stadt Dresden press release, 10 February 2016, https://www.
dresden.de/de/rathaus/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/archiv/2016/02/pm 029.php (accessed 12 June
2019).
68 Frank Richter, ‘Come together’, Journal der Sa¨chsischen Landeszentrale fu¨r Politische Bildung, 1 (2013),
8.
69 ‘“Erinnerung vielfa¨ltig gestalten”ʼ (note 66).
70 Cited in ‘Dresden am 13. Februar’ (note 67).
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Mo¨glichkeit ein deutlicher Bezug zur Gegenwart hergestellt werden’.71
Not only does this recognise the limitations of symbolic and ritualised
practices such as the Heidefriedhof ceremony or the ‘Menschenkette’, but
it understands the need for more interactive and less official practices.
Through its reference to the present, the ‘Gedenkkonzept’ accepts that
the past is shaped by, and serves a purpose in, the present. Hilbert
has since repeatedly adopted such a stance in his own commemorative
contributions. In 2016, he argued that the bombings do not represent
merely a responsibility to remember, but also a call ‘im Sinne derjenigen zu
handeln, die heute unsere Hilfe brauchen. [...] wer sein Herz gegenu¨ber
denjenigen verschließt, die bei uns Schutz suchen, der hat die Botschaft
des 13. Februars nicht verstanden’.72 This statement, made a year after
Germany opened its borders to thousands of refugees, gives yet another
contemporary meaning and political message to the anniversary and the
historical event that it perpetuates.
CONCLUSION
The decade between the sixtieth and seventieth anniversaries of the
Dresden bombings witnessed a profound change in local memory culture.
It resulted in a growing ambiguity of the meaning of victimhood
that acknowledged the complexity of experiences during the war, and
included previously marginalised victim groups, primarily victims of Nazi
persecution and genocide. This was rendered possible through breaking
up the narrowly conceived narrative that isolated the bombings from
their historical context, embedding the bombings in the longer historical
trajectory of the Nazi dictatorship and therefore integrating perpetration
as an important element of historical consciousness.
The changing interpretation of the bombings was interlinked with
a changing landscape of commemorative practices and rituals. By
establishing and reaffirming alternative practices that were politically
unambiguous, the memoryscape of the anniversaries was profoundly
transformed. This article demonstrates how the meaning of anniversaries
is closely tied to the practices which create and recreate that meaning. The
growing ambiguity of the meaning of victimhood and the plurality of voices
and historical narratives were enabled by a pluralisation of commemorative
practices. This pluralisation also marked a shift not only in local memory
culture but also in political culture. Over the years, the anniversaries have
become increasingly politicised, or rather their political character has
been rendered more transparent. The anniversaries were more explicitly
71 ‘“Erinnerung vielfa¨ltig gestalten”ʼ (note 66).
72 ‘Rede von Oberbu¨rgermeister Dirk Hilbert zum Auftakt der Menschenkette’, 13 February
2016, https://www.dresden.de/de/rathaus/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/archiv/2016/02/pm 038.php
(accessed 12 June 2019).
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linked to the fight against Neo-Nazism, thereby changing the historical
lessons that the bombings represent. Initially endorsed by the political left,
the anti-racist and anti-far-right agenda was eventually adopted by the city’s
centre-right political establishment and became official policy.
None of the changes would have been possible without the interventions
and campaigns by various local groups of civil society activists from different
backgrounds. While these local groups were not isolated from wider
discursive constellations and developments at the national or international
levels, local groups translated and adapted these into local contexts. The
dynamics of interacting and negotiating local memory narratives and
practices with city officials shed light on the enormous influence that civil
society activists can have, but also on how both civil society agents and state
officials occupy hybrid commemorative spaces.
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